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Applebaum: The "Undifferentiating Libido": A Need for Federal Legislation to

THE "UNDIFFERENTIATING LIBIDO": A
NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO

PROHIBIT SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY A
BISEXUAL SEXUAL HARASSER
I.

INTRODUCTION

Allison Stem 1 recently graduated from law school ranked third in
her class. Immediately thereafter, she began working as an associate with Emerson, Emerson & Hoffman, a highly regarded Urban
City litigation firm. She began her day at 5:00 a.m. The long commute gave her an opportunity to proofread the briefs that kept her
working until midnight. Although the hours were grueling, she
knew that her commitment was an investment in her future. She
had a great deal of respect for the attorneys at the firm, especially
her supervising partner, Daniel Emerson, whose confidence in her
was invaluable.
A few months after Allison began working for Emerson, conditions began to change. Daniel Emerson retired and Ronald Austin
was promoted to the senior partner of Allison's division. Her success at Emerson depended upon Ronald's evaluation.
Initially, Allison respected Mr. Austin. However, as the weeks
passed, he began to make comments about her appearance, making
her feel uneasy. Shortly thereafter, Austin's subtle comments
progressed into constant overt physical and verbal sexual propositions, creating an unbearable working environment.
Two months later, Allison resigned. She met with an employment
attorney to discuss any appropriate legal actions against her former
employer. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 ("Title VII")
afforded her protection because the firm fell within the jurisdiction
1. This is a fictional story for illustrative purposes only. All names, places and events
have been made up. Any similarity to real names, places and events is purely coincidental.
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66

(codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1994)).
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of the statute.3 Her state also has a discrimination statute similar to
Title VII. Moreover, Allison could have also sought various tort
remedies, one of which is intentional infliction of emotional
4
distress.
After consulting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission5 ("EEOC") guidelines,6 Allison's attorney was confident that
she had a prevailing case. Austin made "unwelcome advances [and]
requests for sexual favors.., that create[d] an intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment."'7 Consequently, her attorney contacted
the EEOC which conducted an investigation and subsequently dismissed the claim. Allison and her attorney were unaware that Ronald Austin was also behaving the same towards Michael, another
associate in the office. Since both a man and a women were being
harassed in the same fashion, Title VII affords no protection to
either victim.
The individual who sexually harasses both sexes alike, the bisexual sexual harasser, presents a troubling anomaly. There is a federal
statute protecting women from sexual harassment in the workplace
by males8 and males from sexual harassment by females. 9 Some
courts have even extended this protection to victims of harassment

3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) which in pertinent part states, "The term 'employer' means
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, and any agent of such a person .... "Id.
4. To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, one
must by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional
distress to another. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
5. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the agency created by Congress
to administer, interpret and enforce Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
6. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996).
7. Id.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.D.C.

1977) (holding that Title VII states a cause of action for sexual harassment); see also infra
notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see also Dillon v. Frank, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 90, 94 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (dismissing the complaint of a homosexual employee

alleging sexual harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, stating that "a discriminatory
practice is unlawful when it occurs because an individual is male or female" and not on the
basis of sexual orientation).
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by members of the same sex as their victims.10 However, no legislation provides a remedy to those harassed by a bisexual harasser.1
This note addresses the inadequacy of federal and state causes of
action addressing the bisexual sexual harasser. An analysis is made
by examining the evolution of the law of sexual harassment. It then
sets forth the reasoning behind the disparity among the courts on
the issue of providing a Title VII remedy to victims of same-sex
sexual harassment. Following, is the rationale for excluding the
bisexual sexual harasser from liability and the problems associated
with this exclusion, such as the lack of available state law remedies.
Finally, it suggests the need for federal legislation prohibiting all
sexual harassment in the workplace.
II.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of [certain]
employees over other[s]," i2 with regard to "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."1 3 Because "sex" was
inserted as a protected classification only one day prior to its passage,14 the legislative history provides no assistance as to the scope
of "sex" within the purview of Title VII.15
Although early courts recognized sexual harassment as a problem, 6 they did not interpret Title VII to encompass sexual harass10. See Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (providing a
cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment); see also Showalter v. Allison Reed Group,
Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991).
11. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55.
12. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
14. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
15. See Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163; see also Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual
Harassmentand 7itle VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. Rnv. 1071 (1989). Historically, Title
VII was applied in a variety of situations. See id at 1072. For example, the outright exclusion
of women from particular jobs and restrictions that have a disproportionate impact on
women but not on men. See i.
16. See, eg., Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163 (stating that the supervisor "was satisfying a
personal urge").
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ment in the workplace.17 The first case to address this issue was
Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc.,'I in which, the court held that the
employment practice must be derived from company policy to be
actionable. 19 The court opined that the supervisor's behavior
"appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity ....
" 20 It
was also concerned that "an outgrowth of holding such activity to
be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented
' 21
advances toward another.
Despite initial ambivalence, courts soon began to recognize sexual harassment under Title VI.13 By permitting Title VII sexual
harassment claims under a quid pro quo theory, courts required
that tangible job benefits are made contingent upon sexual compliance.2s In doing so, they used a "but for" standard to determine
24
whether the harassment constituted sex discrimination.
Courts thereafter began considering "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ''2s to include the state of psychological wellbeing at the workplace in a racial context.26 Thus, an employer violates Title VII by creating or condoning an environment at the
workplace which significantly affects an employee because of his
race or ethnicity, regardless of any tangible job detriment. 27
17. See id.
at 163-65.
18. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
19. See id at 163.
20. Id.(holding that even if the female employees were subjected to verbal and physical
advances from superiors, there was no right to relief under Title VII).
21. Id.
22. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986 (D.D.C. 1977).
23. Id.
at 990. Under a theory of quid pro quo harassment, the corporate defendant is
strictly liable for the supervisor's harassment. See Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident
Ins., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 (M.D. Ala. 1995). Hostile environment sexual harassment,
however, only imputes liability upon the corporate defendant when the harassment was
known to the employer or the employer should have been aware of the harassing conduct.
See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1981); see also infra notes 36-40
and accompanying text.
24. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990. The court held that "but for" her womanhood, the
plaintiff's supervisor would not have solicited her participation in the sexual activity. See id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
26. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that Title VII is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination).
27. See id.
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In the early 1980's, courts began to analogize sexual harassment
to racial harassment. 28 Both situations created a hostile or offensive
environment for members of their respective groups.2 9 Such severe
harassment becomes discriminatory because it deprives the victim
of the right to participate in the work place on equal footing with
others similarly situated.3" Hence, sexual harassment is "every bit
the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality in the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality." 31 The EEOC has since issued
guidelines on sexual harassment. 32 In pertinent part, the guidelines
provide:
unwelcome sexual advances and requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when ... such conduct has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.33
Subsequent to judicial acceptance and the EEOC guidelines, the
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson3 4 expressly
accepted the EEOC's interpretive guidelines, recognizing for the
first time that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive working environment.35 Title VII thus affords employees the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult.
To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment plaintiffs must show that: (1) the employee belongs
to a protected group;36 (2) the employee was subjected to unwel28. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.

29. See id.
30. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210,213 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Henson,
682 F.2d at 902).
31. Id.
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996).
33. Id.
34. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35. See id. at 66-67. The court reasoned that an employer who creates or condones a
work environment which is discriminatorily hostile or abusive to members of a protected
class, such as blacks or women, is thereby discriminating with respect to terms and conditions
of employment. See id.
36. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (requiring a simple stipulation that the employee is a
man or a woman).
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come sexual harassment;37 (3) the harassment was based upon
sex; 38 (4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of
employmen 9 and (5) the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment.4n
The courts apply the same "but for" analysis to hostile environment as to quid pro quo harassment.4n The analysis requires a
determination as to whether the employee would have been
harassed "but for" the employee's gender.4n Since Title VII does
not explicitly limit claims to women, men may also commence a
Title VII action for sexual harassment.4 3
III. SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE DISPARITY
AMONG THE CIRcurrs

There is a disparity among the district and circuit courts as to
whether Title VII affords protection to victims who have been
harassed by members of the same sex. To date, the Supreme Court
has not granted certiorari to a case addressing same-sex sexual harassment. The District of Columbia District Court was first to
examine this issue in dicta in Barnes v. Costle.44 The court stated:
[that there is no reason why sexual harassment] could [not] be
imposed on a male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a subordinate of either gender by a homosexual
superior of the same gender. The legal problem would be identical to that confronting us now [between a male supervisor and a
37. See id.The EEOC regulations define the conduct that constitutes sexual harassment
as "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature ...... 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1996).

38. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
39. See id. at 904. "For sexual harassment to state a claim under Title VII, it must be
sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment." Id. To be actionable, the conduct "need not seriously affect an
employee's psychological well-being ... Title VII comes into play before the harassing
conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived and is perceived as hostile or
injurious, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. See id.
40. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
41. See id at 904; see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.D.C. 1977).
42. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; see also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990.
43. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
44. 561 F.2d 983 (D.D.C. 1977).
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female subordinate] the exaction of a condition which, but for his
or her sex, the employee would not have faced. 45
Relying on the language in Barnes, the Northern District of Illinois,
in 1981, decided Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc.' Wright,
like Barnes, was based upon a quid pro quo harassment theory.47 A

male employee was discharged because he rejected homosexual
advances made toward him by his supervisor.' The court held that
discharging an employee because he rejected homosexual
advances
n9

made by his male supervisor is a violation of Title VII.

The Middle District of Alabama in Joyner v. AAA Cooper Trans-

portation' also directly addressed quid pro quo same-sex sexual
harassment. 5 ' The court in Joyner held that the plaintiff established

a prima facie case of sexual harassment, notwithstanding the harasser and the victim were members of the same sex.52 The courts
readily held that quid pro quo harassment existed between members of the same sex because all that is required is that a supervisor

conditions the terms of employment on the employee's surrendering to the supervisor's sexual demands.53
Until 1990, Joyner and Wright were cited as the only reported
decisions dealing With same-sex sexual harassment. 5 4 Courts had little difficulty recognizing a Title VII claim between members of the
56
same sex.55 In 1990, the court in Parrishv. NationalInsurance Co.

45. Id. at 990 n.55. Interestingly, the court mentions a "homosexual superior." Thus, the
court seems to require that the victim of same-sex sexual harassment by a heterosexual
employer does not state a cause of action under Title VII. See infra notes 87-93 and
accompanying text.
46. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
47. See id. at 308.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 310 (concluding that the reason courts have upheld a female employee's
Title VII claim was "predicated on the notion that making a demand of a female employee
that would not be made of a male employee involves sex discrimination").
50. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
51. See id. at 542.
52. See id at 544. The court held that since the evidence established the supervisor's
homosexual proclivities, the harassment complained of was based upon sex. See id. at 542.
53. See Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D.
Ala. 1995); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
54. See eg., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 n.19 (D. Md.
1994), affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
55. See e.g., Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991).
56. Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-c-4515, 1990 WL 165611, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 16, 1990).
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stated that it would have found a cause of action for same-sex hostile environment harassment, however, the claim was dismissed
because the nature of the conduct did not rise to the level of sexual
harassment.5 7 In EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,5" female employees
alleged sexual harassment by two supervisors, male and female.5 9
Although the court did not specifically address the same-sex issue,
it ruled that the harassment altered the terms and conditions of
employment, thus permitting a hostile environment sexual harass6
ment claim between members of the same sex under Title VII. 0
Following what seemed to be judicial acceptance of the premise
that same-sex sexual harassment was a viable claim under Title VII,
was a line of cases refusing to extend Title VII coverage to such
harassment victims. 6 1 They have all relied on the reasoning of a
1988 district court case, Goluszek v. Smith.62
Goluszek involved a young man who had "never been married
nor had he lived anywhere but at his mother's home. ' 63 He came
from an "unsophisticated background" and "blushe[d] easily and
[wa]s normally sensitive to comments pertaining to sex."' Goluszek's co-workers subjected him to ongoing sexually explicit comments regarding his lack of sexual experience and his sexual
orientation. 65 The court found that his co-workers harassed him
because of his gender and that a jury could conclude that the
employer would have attempted to cease the harassment had the

57. See Parrish, 1990 WL 165611, at *6-7 n.2; see also Showalter, 767 F. Supp. at 1205
(concluding that a cause of action exists where a supervisor coerced plaintiffs to both observe
and engage in a sexual relationship between him and a female employee). But cf. Polly v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135,137 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that it is not
necessary to decide this issue in the present case, but approving the applicability of Title VII
to same-sex sexual harassment in hostile environment claims).
58. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
59. See id. at 1507-08.
60. See id. at 1515-16. This court focused on the severity of the conduct. See id.;see also
Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990) (declaring that a Title VII
cause of action existed for sexual harassment between members of the same sex, but
determined that the alleged conduct did not constitute sexual harassment).
61. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
62. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
63. Id. at 1453.

64. Id.
65. See id.
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plaintiff been a woman.66 However, the court nonetheless granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 67
The court's rationale for denying Title VII protection for samesex sexual harassment was a reading of Title VII, which was, in their
view, "consistent with the underlying concerns of Congress.1 68 The
court held that the defendant's conduct was not the type of conduct
Congress intended to prohibit when it enacted Title VII. 6 9 It reasoned that the goal of Title VII is equal employment opportunity
which was accomplished in part by imposing an affirmative duty on
employers to maintain a working environment free from discriminatory intimidation.70 The discrimination Congress was concerned
about when it enacted Title VII is one stemming from an imbalance
of power and an abuse of that imbalance by superiors which
resulted in discrimination against "a discrete and vulnerable
group."'" In essence, the offender is inferring that the victim is
inferior because of his or her sex.72 Because throughout the times of
the alleged harassment, Goluszek was a male in a male dominated
atmosphere, the court determined that, although he may have been
harassed because he was male, this was clearly not the kind of harassment which created an anti-male environment in the
workplace.73
The Fifth Circuit, in Garcia v. ELF Atochem North America,74
held that harassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not establish a Title VII claim. 75
66. Id. at 1456. The court found evidence that the employer reacted differently to female
claims of sexual harassment. Id. at 1455.
67. See id. at 1456.
68. Id.

69. See id.
70. See iL
71. Id.
Title VII does not make all forms of harassment actionable, nor does it even make
all forms of verbal harassment with sexual overtones actionable. The 'sexual
harassment' that is actionable under Title VII 'is the exploitation of a powerful
position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful
person.'
Id. However, Title VII has consistently been applied to claims brought by a member of a
dominant race against a minority. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
279 (1976); see also Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
72. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
73. See id.
74. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
75. See id. at 448.
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Since Garcia,many federal courts have refused to uphold a Title
VII sexual harassment claim for hostile environment same-sex sexual harassment.76 However, some courts, since Garcia,have recognized a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment under Title
VII even though it seems as if the language of the statute would be
"strained beyond its manifest intent" 77 for the court to hold that
discrimination exists in a same-sex context. 78 These courts rely on
the premise that Title VII is not expressly limited to heterosexual
discrimination. 79 If Title VII was intended to outlaw only heterosexual discrimination, it would have expressly done so.80 On the
contrary, all that is required is that the plaintiff be a member of a
protected group.81 Even where same-sex sexual harassment exists,
these courts have essentially concluded that but for the plaintiff's
sex, the victim would not have been harassed. 82
Some courts have reasoned that the availability of reverse discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII is evidence that same-sex
cases should proceed.83 They also criticize Goluszek because its
rationale relies on legislative history that does not exist in congressional records, but cites to a student note written before
the
4
Supreme Court decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.8
76. Se4 e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis
v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1456 (W.D.
Tex. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
77. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994).
78. See Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v.
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. 111. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F.
Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc., 878 F. Supp.
229 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Vy. 1993).
79. See McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 231. This court also notes that nothing in the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), suggests that Title
VII prohibits heterosexual harassment. See id. The statutory language of Title VII prohibits
employers from discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1994).
80. See Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
81. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
82. See King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Walden Book Co.,
856 F. Supp. at 1103.
83. See King, 911 F. Supp. at 161; Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 8
(D.D.C. 1996); Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1103.
84. See Williams, 916 F. Supp. at S.
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A recent court of appeals decision addressing this issue is McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors.85 This decision contributed an interesting twist to the same-sex dilemma. A male
employee brought a claim under Title VII for sexual harassment by
two male co-workers.86 The court held that, because the alleged
harassers were males and the plaintiff did not proffer evidence that
the harassers were homosexual, there was no cause of action under
Title VII. The Fourth Circuit required a finding of homosexuality
to establish a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment under
Title VII. 88 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, the harassment
could never be "but for" the victim's sex.89 Many courts have since
held that the perpetrator's homosexuality in a same-sex sexual harassment claim is an essential element.9 Consequently, in Wrightson
v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,91 with facts very similar to those in
McWilliams, the plaintiff was able to state a cause of action because
the harasser in Wrightson was homosexual. 92
Congress did not anticipate sexual harassment when it enacted
Title VII, especially as applied to modem cases. This is evidenced
by the last minute insertion of and the lack of legislative intent to
85. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
86. See id. at 1193.
87. See id. at 1195-6.
88. See id
89. See id. But see Jones v. Commander, Kansas Army Ammunitions Plant, 147 F.R.D.
248, 252 (D. Kan. 1993). The court stated that evidence of the sexual preference is irrelevant
because the issue is
whether or not the plaintiff was sexually harassed, not whether the alleged
perpetrator was or could have been sexually interested in the victim because of the
perpetrator's sexual preference. The key in a sexual harassment case is the
perspective of the victim, i.e., whether or not a reasonable victim or person would
believe that he or she was being sexually harassed.
Id
90. See Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Va. 1996); see
also Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996).
Ironically these courts require a showing of homosexuality or bisexuality. See Dixon, 926 F.
Supp. at 551. However at least one court has asserted that the bisexual harasser could be a
bisexual supervisor that singles out one sex, leaving this victim without a Title VII cause of
action. See Ryczek v. Guest Servs., 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995); see also infra notes 113127 and accompanying text. But see Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952,
958 (N.D. Il. 1996) (holding that a male, as a matter of law, cannot sue for sexual harassment
by a fellow male under Title VII, regardless of the perpetrator's sexual orientation).
91. 99 F.3d 138, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1996).
92. See id.
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include sex among the protected classes. 93 However, sex has been a
protected class since 1964 and survived the 1991 amendments. 94
Furthermore, Congress has not shown its disapproval of the application of Title VII to sexual harassment claims, evidenced by the
fact that it has been applied since the late 1970s. 95 Since the
Supreme Court in Meritor, all courts must recognize that sexual
harassment between members of the opposite sex is prohibited pursuant to Title VII.96 As discussed previously, courts are split as to
whether same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title
VH.97 Those who disapprove of Title VII expansion to same-sex
cases argue that the "but for" standard illustrates the inherent
problems with interpreting sexual harassment within the scope of
Title VII. 98 Because a same-sex sexual harasser targets only members of his or her sex, the requisite discriminatory intent is absent. 99
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, 100 commentators still argue that including sexual harassment within Title VII is
inappropriate.' 0 ' They contend that judicial expansion of Title VII
is improper because Congress did not give much thought to the
inclusion of sex, much less to sexual harassment, in the statute. 0 2
"What Congress intended was to equalize job opportunities, not
regulate sexual activity in the workplace."' 3 The argument is still
10 4
being made that sexual harassment is directed at an individual.
These commentators discern that when a supervisor harasses an
employee, he or she is satisfying a personal urge and the harass93. See supra notes 14-15.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
95. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
96. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
97. See supra notes 44-91 and accompanying text.
98. See Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual Harassmentand Title VII-A BetterSolution,
30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1095 (1989) (arguing that Title VII should not provide a remedy for
sexual harassment claims).
99. See id.
100. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 57.
101. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination:A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 333 (1990); Pierce, supra note 98, at 1094-95; see also
Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Judge Bork's dissenting opinion from a
denial of rehearing en bane).
102. See Pierce, supra note 98, at 1092.
103. Id. at 1092.
104. See iU. at 1092.
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ment is not an attack upon the entire gender.1" 5 The willingness to
expand Title VII stemmed from the difficulties associated with
bringing sexual harassment claims under a tort theory.106 One court
reasoned that so long as women remain inferior to men in the workplace, they would have little protection against harassment. 10 7
Apparently, Title VII was extended to sexual harassment because
the behavior is repulsive and should be curbed. With no alternative,
it is treated as a violation of Title VII. 08 In a dissenting opinion
from a denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Bork appreciated the
doctrinal difficulty in this area due to the "awkwardness of classifying sexual advances as discrimination."10 9 He stated, "[h]arassment
is reprehensible, but Title VII was passed to outlaw discriminatory
behavior and not simply behavior of which we strongly
disapprove."' 10
IV.

TBE BISEXUAL

SEXUAL HARASSER:

A

PERPLEXING

LOOPHOLE

One major problem with classifying sexual harassment under
Title VII is, regardless of how offensive the harassment, if done
bisexually, it is legally permissible. 1
Had Congress been aiming at sexual harassment, it seems
unlikely that a woman would be protected from unwelcome heterosexual or lesbian advances but left unprotected when a bisexual attacks. That bizarre result is evidence that Congress was not
thinking of individual harassment at all but of discrimination in
conditions of employment because of gender." 2
Yet, sexual harassment is a problem.
105. See id.at 1093.
106. See id.
at 1093; see also Robert F. Conte & David L. Gregory, Sexual Harassmentin
Employment-Some Proposals Toward More Realistic Standards of Liaiility, 32 DRAKE L.
REv.407, 417 n.17 (1983).
107. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945 (questioning, "[H]ow [can] sexual harassment, which
injects the most demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and which
always represents an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy, [can] not be
illegal.")
109. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1333 n.7.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
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[U]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [to the extent
that it] either affects an individual's work performance or creates
an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment, or where submission to13or rejection

. . .

is used as a basis for employment

decisions
is so inappropriate in the working environment, that it appears
abhorrent to our social fabric to permit it.114 When a supervisor
uses his or her position of power to create such a situation, it seems
disconcerting, regardless of the sexual preference of the harasser or
the history of the particular harasser's harassing conduct.
The bisexual sexual harasser is most often known as the sexual
harasser who harasses both men and women,"' however courts and
commentators have varying definitions.116 One author defines the
bisexual sexual harasser in terms of the supervisor's sexual orientation.1 17 In this context, the bisexual sexual harasser is the harasser
who is bisexual, but may only single out one sex. 1 One case recognized this confusion and although dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, it stated
the Court notes that th[e] language in Barnes could be interpreted to prohibit Title VII sexual harassment cases any time a
supervisor is bisexual. Alternatively, the language could mean
that a supervisor is only immune from Title VII sexual harassment suits when there is evidence that
the supervisor has actually
9
harassed members of both sexes."
If the bisexual sexual harasser is a supervisor who has a bisexual
orientation, but happens to single out one sex, the definition of
bisexuality could create problems. This definition could often be
very subjective and easily utilized as an affirmative defense.120
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996).
114. See MeWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.
1996) ("[Tlhere perhaps 'ought to be a law against' such puerile and repulsive workplace
behavior... in order to protect the victims against its indignities and debilitation, but we
conclude that Title VII is not the law.")

115. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that the
bisexual harasser only describes an individual who harasses members of both sexes).
116. See Ruth Colker, A BisexualJurisprudence,3 L. & Sax 127 (1993).
117. See id.

118. See id.
119. Ryczek v. Guest Servs. Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754, 761 n.6 (D.D.C. 1995).
120. See generally Colker, supranote 116, at 127. The author insists that from a bisexual
perspective, "blatant homophobia" underlies this rule exempting bisexuals from liability. Id.
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Under this definition, if the "but for" standard controls the determination of whether sexual harassment is actionable 121 and the
supervisor is sexually attracted to both sexes the standard is impossible to satisfy." However, the most accepted definition of the
bisexual sexual harasser is one who harasses members of both
sexes." z Since McWilliams, it is unclear whether the defendant
must establish bisexuality. 24
The loophole for the bisexual harasser can potentially cause
supervisors to harass both sexes to avoid liability from harassing
one, thus leaving victims without recourse.'2 Moreover, society is
becoming more open minded toward varying sexual preferences. 26
Therefore, a straight supervisor could find it less humiliating today
to lie about his sexual preference to avoid liability than he would
have found it in the past. Furthermore, if a bisexual supervisor
would normally single out one sex, he could be more likely to harass the other to escape liability.
at 135. As for the same-sex cases, she argues that by offering the worker legal protection
when a homosexual supervisor harasses a subordinate, the courts are giving the employer a
reason for firing the lesbian or gay supervisor. See id. Since sexual orientation is not
protected from discrimination, the employer may fire the gay or lesbian supervisor regardless
of whether harassment was found. See id. In the case of the bisexual supervisor, she assesses
the reason for this exception is either because bisexuals are politically favored to the gay and
lesbian community or courts either do not believe they exist or would not think that bisexuals
would "take advantage of this doctrine." Id. at 136. This is because bisexuals, like gay and
lesbian people, are not protected from discrimination and could be fired as a consequence of
being bisexual. See id.
121. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
123. See Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 288 ("[O]nly in the rare case when the supervisor harasses
both sexes equally can there be no discrimination. If however, the supervisor singles out one
sex, then the protections of Title VII are invoked.").
124. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195. It would, however, be difficult not to show that the
harasser is bisexual in the case of a bisexual sexual harasser because the defendant would
have to prove that he is treating both sexes alike, unless the court does not distinguish
between the bisexual sexual harasser and the equal opportunity harasser as the court did in
Chiapuzio v. BLT OperatingCorp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wy. 1993). See also infranotes 13138 and accompanying text. Unlike McWilliams, in the case of a bisexual sexual harasser, it
would be the employer that would have to prove bisexuality. This has the potential for
causing great confusion because the cases since McWilliams have required the victim of
same-sex sexual harassment to show evidence that the harasser is either homosexual or
bisexual. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
125. See discussion of the options afforded to sexual harassment victims discussed in Part
IV infra.
126. See Colker, supra note 116, at 135.
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Technically, Title VII should not provide a remedy to victims of
bisexual harassment because the harasser is treating both sexes
alike and therefore, the requisite "but for" standard can never be
satisfied. However, the male supervisor may only sexually harass
one woman, despite working among several. Similarly, in a samesex sexual harassment situation, not everyone of the harasser's gender will be harassed. The "but for" standard is not necessarily "but
for" the victim's sex, rather "but for" the employer's sexual attraction to the employee, the employee would not have been
harassed. 127
Since many courts have stretched Title VII beyond its original
legislative intent, they might contemplate stretching it to include
the bisexual sexual harasser as well.' 2 8 The "but for" standard is
inappropriate, but because this issue is forced into the rubric of sex
discrimination, there is no alternative. Although sexual harassment
may be improperly included under Title VII, the behavior should
be proscribed somewhere. Without protection for victims of bisexual harassment, the message courts are sending is not, don't sexually harass, but rather, harass everyone and, depending upon the
court, fake your sexual orientation. 129 It may be worth avoiding liability for you or your employer. This is because "only the differenti130
ating libido runs afoul of Title VII.'
Fortunately, one court has provided Title VII protection to victims of the equal opportunity harasser, distinguishing it from the
bisexual sexual harasser.' 3 ' Where men and women are both subjected to harassment, a plaintiff can prove discrimination on the
basis of sex by showing that members of the opposite sex were
127. See Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual Harassmentand Title VII-A Better Solution,
30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1090 (1989).
128. Courts have even extended Title VII to include situations where a fellow employee
was given preferential treatment because the employee granted the employer sexual favors.
See Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983); see also Pierce, supra note 127, at
1090. But see Ayers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 826 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding
that favoring a paramour or disfavoring a non-paramour does not constitute a violation of
Title VII).
129. See Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wy. 1993)

(differentiating between the bisexual and equal opportunity harasser, noting that there is a
viable claim against the equal opportunity harasser who, although harasses men and women,
does not harass them "alike").
130. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
131. See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337-38.
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treated differently. 32 In Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp.,133 the
supervisor subjected women to "an incessant series of sexually abusive remarks" and also made harassing comments to a male
employee about his wife.134 In this case, Title VII prohibited the
harasser's conduct. 135 Because the supervisor's comments to the
man were about his wife and were directed to the women personally, the harasser essentially differentiated between the women and
the man. Consequently, the harasser was not a bisexual sexual harasser, but rather, an equal opportunity harasser whose behavior is
36
prohibited by Title VII.
V.

CONFUSION ASSOCIATED WITH THE EXCLUSION OF THE

BISEXUAL SEXuALHARASSER
In cases where the harasser treats men and women alike, the
question arises as to whether the harasser's sexual preference
becomes an issue, as was required in McWilliams.'37 Making sexual
orientation a jury question is dangerous. 138 Enough liability may
facilitate lying. In the case of the supervisor, his job may be at stake
if he causes the employer to be liable.
What could end up being central to a claim is the definition of
bisexuality. Is it someone who is attracted to members of both
sexes? Is it someone who has had sexual relations with both sexes?
Is it someone who, at one time experimented with a member of the
same sex, but has since been married for twenty-five years to someone of the opposite sex? Do we want juries making a determination
132. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the district court's conclusion that supervisor's harassment of men and women
alike precluded plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment, stating that male supervisor's use of
sexual insult's against male as well as female employees does not cure supervisor of sexual
harassment claims by employees and noting "we do not rule out the possibility that both men
and women working at Showboat have viable claims ... for sexual harassment"); see also
Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337-38 (permitting a Title VII sexual harassment claim where
supervisor harassed both men and women so long as the plaintiff demonstrates that
harassment was based upon his or her sex).
133. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wy. 1993).
134. ld.
135. See iL at 1335.
136. See id. at 1336. In essence, if the supervisor had been bisexual and harassed both
employees alike, Title VII would not have prohibited his conduct towards both the male or
female employees. Thus, the supervisor's sexual orientation invariably becomes an issue. See
id.
137. See discussion supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
138. See Ryczek v. Guest Servs., 877 F. Supp. 754, 761 (D.D.C. 1995).
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by using their stereotypes of bisexuals to ascertain whether there is
a Title VII cause of action? Moreover do we want to spend the time
on extrinsic evidence determining the supervisor's sexual orientation? Will that entail trying to locate former sexual partners of the
harasser?
The validity of the previous harassment presents another problem. All of the courts that have eluded to this issue deal with concurrent harassment. Suppose a woman is currently being sexually
harassed by her male supervisor. She sues for sexual harassment
under Title VII and discovers that ten years ago, the supervisor
made sexual advances towards a man. What would be the just
result? Does the jury then have to determine the validity of the
sexual harassment of his previous victim by determining whether
plaintiff established a prima facie case? Is it logical for the viability
of an actionable Title VII claim to depend on whether the former
victim comes forward and not on the conduct or its effect on the
victim?
VI.

PROBLEMS WITH ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF ACION

If there were alternatives for victims of the bisexual sexual harasser, excluding them from liability under Title VII would not
appear so troubling. Common law tort claims are available to plaintiffs, notwithstanding that their sex discrimination claim under Title
VII would not survive summary judgment in the case of a bisexual
sexual harasser. Unfortunately, the elements are difficult to satisfy
in most sexual harassment claims. 139 Intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery are common causes of action for
sexual harassment victims.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress140 protects
conduct that "go[es] beyond all possible bounds of decency and [is]
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society."'' One might argue that this tort would apply to all sexual
harassment claims because bringing sex into the workplace seems
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society,"' 42 how139. Consequential and punitive damages are available in tort claims, however, there is a
cap under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (1994).
140. RESTATEmBNT (SncoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
141. Id. §46 cmt.(d) (1965).

142. Id.
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ever, satisfying the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is extremely difficult.
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires that the plaintiff demonstrate (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct on the part of the defendant, (2) the defendant's intention
of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress and (3) severe or extreme emotional distress.14 3
What makes this even more difficult is that often victims do not
experience emotional distress, yet it does not make the harasser's
conduct any more acceptable. 1"
Sexual harassment is easier to establish than a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 145 This is because the
Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,146 declared that
there is no requirement that the conduct seriously affect the
employee's psychological well-being. 47 Therefore, in a situation
where the victim is fired or the conduct was offensive enough to
cause a reasonable person to resign, but did not rise to the level of
outrageousness or extreme emotional distress, the plaintiff would
not prevail under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress."4 Moreover, if the conduct would cause a reasonable person
extreme emotional distress, but did not in fact cause this particular
plaintiff to experience such distress, there is also no cause of action
under this theory. Some courts have acknowledged a lessor showing
of emotional distress when a special relationship exists between the
parties, such as an employer-employee relationship.1 49 However,
143. See id. § 46.
144. But see Gleason v. Callahan Indus., Inc., 610 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (N.Y. App. Div.

1994) (recognizing that even though aggrieved individuals do not need to produce the
quantum and quality of evidence to prove compensatory damages as they would have to
produce under other circumstances because of the strong anti-discriminatory policy, there
must be sufficient proof of mental anguish caused by the discrimination); Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'r, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 nA (Cal. 1970) (acknowledging a lesser showing of severe
emotional distress when a special relationship exists between the parties, such as an
employer-employee relationship).
145. See Collins v. Willcox Inc., 600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (suggesting
that "although each individual act allegedly attributable to ... [the supervisor] is probably
not actionable, except as to a specific claim for sexual harassment," that sexual harassment is
easier to establish).
146. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
147. See id. at 371.
148. See Collins, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (suggesting that sexual harassment is easier to prove
than intentional infliction of emotional distress).
149. See Alcorn, 468 P2d at 218 n.4.
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there still must be some showing of emotional distress.'1 0 Additionally one court recognizes that because of a strong anti-discriminatory sentiment, aggrieved individuals do not need to produce the
quantum and quality of evidence to prove compensatory damages
as is required to produce under most circumstances, however, there
still must be some proof of mental anguish caused by the
discrimination.151
Assault and battery are additional avenues for sexual harassment
victims. Unfortunately, a battery action is only appropriate where
there is unpermitted physical contact.152 The Supreme Court in
Harrisdeclared that an environment can be considered hostile or
abusive with only a mere offensive utterance, depending on the
totality of the circumstances. 3
Unlike battery, assault does not require contact, but an apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact.' 54 Words alone generally
are insufficient to support a cause of action for assault, yet may be
5
sufficient to support a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.'
Many states also have discrimination statutes that encompass sexual harassment. 6 Unfortunately, these discrimination statutes
were modeled after Title VII. Consequently, the language is either
identical to Title VII or varies slightly. As such, the legislation
would not encompass protection from the bisexual sexual harasser
because of the applicability of the "but for" standard. 57 Even the
states with specific sexual harassment statutes would not protect
these victims8 because they denote a "but for" standard, as set forth
5
in Meritor
150. See id.
151. See Gleason, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
152. See WiLuiA PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 8, at 39 (4th ed. 1971).
153. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
154. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 21 (1965).
155. See id. at § 31; see also Harris,510 U.S. at 22.
156. Se4 e.g., CA Gov'T CODE § 12940(h) (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a60 (West 1995).
157. See, e.g., Childress v. City of Richmond Virginia, 907 F. Supp. 934, 942 (E.D. Va.
1995) (asserting that "this right [to sue under Virginia Human Rights Act] does not appear to
add to the substantive provisions of federal law"); Harrison v. Chance, 797 P.2d 200, 203-04
(Mont. 1990) ("Because the Montana Human Rights Act was closely modeled after Title VII,
reference to federal case law is appropriate and helpful in construing the Montana Human
Rights Act.").
158. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,719 (5th Cir. 1986); CAL GOV'T CODE
§ 12940(h) (having a special provision outlawing sexual harassment, however, requires a "but
for" standard in its language).
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For bisexual sexual harassment victims, where the harassing
behavior does not amount to severe emotional distress, but aggravating enough to cause a reasonable person to leave his or her job,
there is no cause of action.159 This lack of recourse is due to the
"but for" standard that is not even wholeheartedly applied in the
case of harassment by a superior against a member of the opposite
sex.' 60 Unfortunately, interpreting sexual harassment within the
purview of Title VII leaves no logical alternative but to encompass
a discriminatory requirement.
The fact that sexual harassment is a problem is undisputed. Even
the early courts, although disagreeing that this behavior should be
16
extracted from Title VII, recognized its disturbing effect. '
Whether we title this conduct discrimination or we call it something
else, it should be outlawed. Sexual harassment is inappropriate in
the workplace and those in superior positions should be prohibited
from using their power to intimidate their subordinates. Regardless
of whether it is included within the scope of Title VII does not matter, Congress needs to prohibit this activity.
VII.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION:

A PossmILE

SOLUTION

A plausible solution is the passage of federal legislation prohibiting conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace. 62 With such legislation, victims would have a cause of action and supervisors would
not have an escape from liability. Congress can utilize the definition
of sexual harassment contained within the EEOC guidelines. 163 By
159. See Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Come v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 390 F. Supp. 161,163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("[I]t would be ludicrous to hold
that [sexual harassment] was contemplated by [itle VII] because to do so would mean that if
the conduct complained of was directed equally to males there would be no bases for suit.").
160. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
161. See Come, 390 F. Supp. 161.
162. See Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual Harassmentand Title VII-A Better Solution,
30 B.C. L. REv. 1071 (1989) (proposing that federal legislation be passed due to various
loopholes that result from interpreting sexual harassment under Title VII despite the fact
that it is not likely that Congress will pass such legislation); Deborah N. McFarland, Beyond
Sex Discrimination:A Proposalfor FederalSexual HarassmentLegislation, 65 FoRDHAm L.
REv. 493, 542 (1996) (asserting that federal sexual harassment legislation should be enacted
to "focus on the conduct at issue rather than on discrimination .... ).
163. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996). Omitting the first sentence from the guidelines:
"[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of 703 of Title VII." Id. This is because we are
no longer going to view sexual harassment in light of Title VII. The damages and those
employers within the statute's jurisdiction could be modeled after Title VII.
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omitting the "but for" standard mandated by Title VII, this legislation would include within its ambit a same-sex sexual harasser,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, heterosexual opposite sex
sexual harassment, the equal opportunity harasser and the bisexual
harasser. The behavior would be prohibited and their victims would
be protected.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Any action taken in violation of Title VII must clearly be discriminatory. Therefore, it seems logical that a "but for" standard
apply.164 However, in a sexual harassment context, a man harasses a
woman, not necessarily simply because of her sex, but on the basis
of her attractiveness. This point is illustrated by the situation where
a male supervisor could work with fifty woman, but may only harass
one. The fact that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable in some
circuits is inconsistent with what Title VII was intended to prevent.' 65 Moreover, the cognizability of sexual harassment claims
brought by men against women also contradicts the intention of
Congress. The judicial expansion of Title VII to include sexual harassment is noble in trying to prevent such atrocities in the workplace. However, including it within discrimination legislation is
inappropriate because the same behavior would be enough to
establish sexual harassment in one situation and not in another,
depending upon the sex and the sexual orientation of the harasser.
Since tort remedies are not always available to sexual harassment
victims, the best solution is legislation. Consequently, a victim
would have the choice of pursuing various tort remedies if available. And the victim66may still seek actual damages under the sexual
harassment statute.'
Prohibiting harassment when a supervisor engages in crude
behavior to one gender, but not when that same behavior is
directed equally towards both is illogical. Additionally, making sexual orientation a jury question presents a judicial nightmare. The
indecent behavior is reprehensible and should be unlawful, regard164. If it was not done "but for" what is being discriminated against, the act would not be
discriminatory.
165. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
166. See supra note 139.
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less of the sex or the sexual orientation of the perpetrator and his or
her history of harassing conduct.
By permitting bisexual sexual harassers to escape liability, we are
focusing on the harasser and not on the harasser's conduct and its
effect upon the victim. The environment is no less hostile for the
sexual harassment victim knowing that the supervisor is just as
offensive towards those of the opposite sex. It is no more tolerable
that, although the male victim's working environment was unbearable, so was the working environment of a fellow female worker.
The fact that the harasser is a bisexual sexual harasser does not
eliminate the impact that the harassing conduct has upon his
victims.
Robin Applebaum
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